UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-29-2013

State v. Eddins Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39933

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Eddins Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39933" (2013). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4103.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4103

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDA [0
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
BRANDON EDDINS,
Defendant-Appellant.

-COpy
No. 39933
Nez Perce Co. Case No.
CR-2010-5989

--------------------------)
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

HONORABLE CARL B. KERRICK
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT·APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ............................................................................... 1
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings ................................... 1
ISSUES ........................................................................................................... 3
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................... 4
I.

II.

Eddins Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error
With Respect To His UnpreseNed Claim Of
Prosecutorial Misconduct. .......................................................... 4
A.

Introduction ..................................................................... 4

B.

Standard Of Review ........................................................ 4

C.

Eddins Has Failed To Show Any Misconduct,
Much Less Misconduct Rising To The Level Of
Fundamental Error .......................................................... 4

Eddins Has Failed To Show The District Court
Abused Its Discretion By Ordering Him To Pay
Restitution For The Victim's Economic Losses
That Were Actually And Proximately Caused By
Eddins' Criminal Conduct ........................................................ 11
A.

Introduction ................................................................... 11

B.

Standard Of Review ...................................................... 12

C.

Substantial Evidence Supports The District
Court's Finding That The Victim's Injury Was
Caused By Eddins' Criminal Conduct. .......................... 12

CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 18
CERTIFICATE OF SERViCE ........................................................................ 18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

PAGE

Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 204 P.3d 508 (2009) ...................................... 13
State v. Card, 146 Idaho 111, 190 P.3d 930 (Ct. App. 2008) ............................. 12
State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599,249 P.3d 398 (2011) ...................... 12, 13, 14, 17
State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387, 271 P.3d 1243 (Ct. App. 2012) .................. 13, 14
State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 594 P.2d 146 (1979) ........................................... 6
State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 198 P.3d 128 (Ct. App. 2008) ..................... 10
State v. Higley, 151 Idaho 76,253 P.3d 750 (Ct. App. 2010) ............................. 12
State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206,296 P.3d 412 (Ct. App. 2013) ................................ 12
State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259,233 P.3d 190 (Ct. App. 2010) ......................... .4
State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 223 P.3d 750 (2009) ..................................... 13
State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491,283 P.3d 808 (Ct. App. 2012) ....................... 13
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,245 P.3d 961 (2010) ................................... passim
State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 156 P .3d 583 (Ct. App. 2007) .............................. 6
State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772,948 P.2d 127 (1997) ........................................... 6
State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6,909 P.2d 624 (Ct. App. 1995) .................................. 6
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 215 P.3d 414 (2009) ...................................... 6
State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 292 P.3d 273 (2013) ........................................ 12

STATUTES
I.C. § 18-901 ....................................................................................................... 10
I.C. § 18-903 ...................................................................................................8, 11
I.C. § 19-5304 ............................................................................................... 12, 17
ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Brandon Tyler Eddins appeals from the judgment of conviction and
restitution order entered upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of aggravated
assault and of being a persistent violator of the law.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
While driving to his girlfriend's grandmother's house, Daniel Hight saw
Eddins, who had been harassing Daniel and his girlfriend. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.1B, L.20
- p.21, L.2.1) In an attempt to avoid a conflict, Daniel drove past Eddins and
around the block, but Eddins chased after him.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.20, L.2 - p.21,

L.17.) "[S]ick of' being harassed, Daniel stopped the car and got out to confront
Eddins. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.21, L.1B - p.22, L.14.) Within seconds of Daniel exiting
the car, Eddins "got in [Daniel's] face" and "hit [him] in the eye with a bottle of
acid." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.22, L.12 - p.23, L.2; see also Tr., Vol. 1, p.24, Ls.1-2, p.43,
Ls.1-5, p.51, L.16 - p.53, L.7, p.59, Ls.15-20, p.60, Ls.16-25.)

The acid

permeated Daniel's eye, resulting in what Daniel's ophthalmologist characterized
as the "worst chemical injury" he had ever seen.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.115, Ls.6-9.)

Despite the best efforts of physicians, Daniel's eye never recovered and,
ultimately, it had to be surgically removed. (Tr., Vol.1, p.26, Ls.6-15, p.27, L.B-

1 The appellate record contains several separately bound volumes of transcripts.
For uniformity and ease of reference, the state has adopted the numbering and
citation system used by Eddins in his Appellant's brief. (See Appellant's brief,
p.1 n.1 (designating the separately bound transcripts by volume number).)
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p.28, L.5, p.111, L.16 - p.114, L.14, p.116, L.16 - p.121, L.25, p.135, L.11 p.137, L.25.)
The state charged Eddins with aggravated battery (by means of corrosive
acid and/or a caustic chemical), with a persistent violator enhancement.

(R.,

pp.83-85, 172-73.) At trial, Eddins testified and admitted that he was carrying a
bottle of acid on the night in question. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.174, Ls.4-14, p.176, L.18p.177, L.5.)

He also admitted to having threatened Daniel during their

confrontation, telling him to "back off, man, I have acid." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.171, LS.68, p.176, L.22 - p.177, L.1.) He denied having intentionally hit Daniel with the
acid, however, maintaining instead that Daniel pushed the bottle of acid out of
his hands, causing it to spill acid on both of them.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.170, L.19 -

p.172, L.8, p.172, L.24-p.173, L.7, p.173, Ls.17-21, p.177, Ls.6-9.)
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Eddins not
guilty of aggravated battery, but guilty of aggravated assault and of being a
persistent violator. (R., pp.249-51.) The district court entered judgment on the
jury's verdict and imposed a unified sentence of 15 years, with six years fixed.
(R., pp.327-30.) Over Eddins' objection, the court also ordered Eddins to pay

restitution in the amount of $5,241.79 to the victim's crime fund, to compensate it
for the medical expenses it had paid on Daniel's behalf. (Tr., Vo1.3, p.28, L.18 p.29, L.16, p.40, L.13 - p.41, L.1; R., pp.328-29, 339-40; PSI, p.3.)
timely appeals. (R., pp.343-45.)
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Eddins

ISSUES
Eddins states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct by
misrepresenting or mischaracterizing the evidence in her
closing argument?

2.

Whether the district court improperly awarded restitution for
damages not caused by Mr. Eddins's culpable conduct.

(Appellant's brief, p.5 (punctuation original).)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Eddins failed to show fundamental error with respect to his
unpreserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct?

2.

Has Eddins failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by
requiring Eddins to pay restitution for the victim's economic losses that
were proximately caused by Eddins' criminal conduct?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Eddins Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error With Respect To His
Unpreserved Claim Of Prosecutorial Misconduct

A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal, Eddins argues the prosecutor committed

misconduct amounting to fundamental error. SpecificaJly, he contends that, in
closing argument, the prosecutor made statements that both mischaracterized
the evidence and improperly appealed to the jurors' emotions. (Appellant's brief,
pp.6-9.) Eddins' argument fails; a review of the challenged statements shows no
misconduct, much less misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
Where, as here, a defendant fails to timely object at trial to allegedly

improper closing arguments by the prosecutor, the conviction will be set aside for
prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing by the defendant that the alleged
misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error.

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho

209,228,245 P.3d 961,980 (2010).

C.

Eddins Has Failed To Show Any Misconduct, Much Less Misconduct
Rising To The Level Of Fundamental Error
An unpreserved issue may only be considered on appeal if it "constitutes

fundamental error." State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196
(Ct. App. 2010). In the absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to
remedy that error is strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the
defendant being deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right
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to a fair trial in a fair tribunal." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961,
976 (2010).

Review without objection will not lie unless (1) the defendant

demonstrates that "one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights
were violated;" (2) the constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the record,
"without the need for any additional information" including information "as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision;" and (3) the "defendant must
demonstrate that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights," generally
by showing a reasonable probability that the error "affected the outcome of the
trial proceedings."

19.:. at 226,

245 P.3d at 978.

Eddins was charged with aggravated battery. (R., pp.83-85, 172-73.) In
arguing to the jury that it should find Eddins guilty of that charge, the prosecutor
twice reminded the jury of the severity of the injury Daniel Hight sustained as a
result of having acid thrown on him.

Specifically, the prosecutor opened her

closing argument by stating:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, when I spoke with you
yesterday morning, I told you that at the end of this trial, you would
have the information in front of you on how Daniel Hight lost one of
his most importance [sic] senses, how he lost his left eye and he
lost his sense of sight.
(Tr., Vo1.2, p.140, L.24 - p.141, LA.)

Then, after discussing at length the

elements of aggravated battery and the evidence that supported each of those
elements (Tr., Vo1.2, p.141, L.5 - p.148, L.23), the prosecutor concluded her
closing argument by stating:
The acid used on Daniel Hight's eye on July 11th changed
his life. He has lost his sight, and he has lost his eye. Based on all
of the testimony and the evidence you have in front of you now,
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you have enough to find the defendant guilty of aggravated battery.
Thank you.
(Tr., Vo1.2, p.148, L.24 - p.149, L.4).
Eddins did not object to the prosecutor's arguments below, but he
contends on appeal that, by arguing to the jury that Daniel "lost his sense of
sight," the prosecutor "misrepresented the evidence and improperly appealed to
the jurors' emotions.,,2 (Appellant's brief, p.6 (capitalization altered, underlining
omitted).)

Eddins' argument is without merit; he has failed to show that the

complained of statements were improper, much less that they rose to the level of
fundamental error.
A prosecutor has considerable latitude in closing argument.

State v.

Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 720, 215 P.3d 414, 440 (2009); State v. Porter, 130
Idaho 772,786,948 P.2d 127, 141 (1997); State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6,14,909
P.2d 624, 632 (Ct. App. 1995). He or she is entitled to argue all reasonable
inferences from the evidence in the record. Severson, 147 Idaho at 720, 215
P.3d at 440; Porter, 130 Idaho at 786, 948 P.2d at 141 (citing State v. Garcia,
100 Idaho 108, 110, 594 P.2d 146, 148 (1979)).

Appeals to the emotion,

passion, or prejudice of the jury through the use of inflammatory tactics are
impermissible. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583, 588 (Ct. App.

2 Eddins consistently cites "Tr., Vo1.2, p.119, L.25; Tr., Vo1.2, p.148, L.25" as
support for his assertion that the prosecutor argued to the jury that Daniel had
"lost his sense of sight." (See Appellant's brief, pp.3, 8.) While the state
acknowledges the prosecutor twice stated Daniel had lost "his sense of sight"
(see Tr., Vo1.2, p.116, Ls.20-23, p.141, Ls.2-4), she did not do so at either
portion of the transcript cited by Eddins in his Appellant's brief (see Tr., Vo1.2,
p.119, L.25 (defense counsel speaking), p.148, L.25 (prosecutor arguing: "July
11th changed his life. He has lost his sight, and")).
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2007). Nor maya prosecutor "attempt[] to secure a verdict on any factor other
than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during
trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence," as
doing so, "impacts a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial."
Perry, 150 Idaho at 227,245 P.3d at 979.
Contrary to Eddins' claims on appeal, the prosecutor's statements in this
case - that Daniel Hight "lost his sense of sight" and/or "lost his sight" - were
neither false nor an impermissible appeal to the emotions of the jury.

Daniel

testified that, after Eddins hit him in the eye with the bottle of acid, he was unable
to see out of that eye, that he never regained vision in his eye, and that, despite
weeks of treatment, doctors were unable to save it.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.24, Ls.1-2,

p.25, Ls.18-21, p.26, Ls.9-17.) Daniel's ophthalmologist likewise testified that he
was unable to save Daniel'S eye and, ultimately, it had to be surgically removed.
(Tr., Vol. 1, p.111, L.16 - p.114, L.14, p.116, L.16 - p.121, L.25.) In light of the
fact that the evidence showed Daniel actually lost one of his eyes as a result of
the acid attack, the prosecutor's statements that Daniel "lost his sense of sight"
and/or "lost his sight" were entirely accurate, at least as to the eye Daniel lost. In
fact, each time the prosecutor referred in her closing argument to Daniel having
"lost his sense of sight" or "lost his sight," she also stated in the same breath that
Daniel had lost only one of his eyes. (See Tr., Vol.2, p.141, Ls.2-4 ("he lost his
left eye and he lost his sense of sight), p.148, L.25 - p.149, L.1 ("He has lost his
sight, and he has lost his eye.").) That the prosecutor did not also specifically
articulate what was already obvious to the jury (both from having observed
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Daniel on the witness stand and from having heard him testify) - i.e., that Daniel
still had vision in his remaining eye - does not show any misrepresentation or
embellishment by the prosecutor in an attempt to bolster the state's case.
Nor does it show any attempt by the prosecutor to secure a guilty verdict
by appealing to the jurors' emotions.

Eddins was charged with aggravated

battery. To prove that charge, the state was required to prove, inter alia, that
Eddins "unlawfully and intentionally caus[ed] bodily harm to" Daniel. (Compare
R., p.264 (Jury Instruction No.1 0) with I.C. § 18-903.) Pointing out that Eddins
actually lost his eye and, thus, his "sense of sight" or "sight" in that eye goes
directly to the element of crime that required the state to prove an injury.
Because the prosecutor's statements were based on the evidence and related
directly to an element of the crime the state was required to prove, Eddins has
failed to show any error at all, much less error of constitutional significance. His
claim of prosecutorial misconduct thus fails on first prong of the Perry
fundamental error analysis.
Even assuming Eddins could overcome the first prong of the Perry test for
fundamental error, his claim of prosecutorial misconduct nevertheless fails on
the second prong of the test, which requires Eddins to demonstrate that the error
he asserts is "clear or obvious" on the record. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226,245 P.3d
at 978. Eddins argues the error is "plain from the face of the record" because
"the prosecutor's statement that Mr. Hight had 'lost his sense sight' [sic] was
blatantly wrong, and could only serve to appeal to the passions of the jury."
(Appellant's brief, p.8.) As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, however, the
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complained-of statements were both supported by the evidence and relevant to
an element of the charged crime. Perhaps more importantly as it relates to the
"clear and obvious" prong of Perry, it appears from the record that, to the extent
defense counsel below believed there was anything improper about the
prosecutor's statements, he deliberately chose to forego an objection and opted
instead to address the prosecutor's remarks in his own closing argument.
Specifically, defense counsel argued:
Now, ladies and gentlemen, we saw a lot of pictures, a lot of
doctor testimony about what happened to Mr. Hight's eye. And the
State is trying to appeal through emotions. They want to appeal to
your sympathies. We all feel bad for Mr. Hight. This is a tragic
accident. Who would not feel bad for him? But that's just what this
was, an accident. And tragedy does not equal intentional.
The State is trying to make you feel bad for Mr. Hight by
saying he lost one of his five senses; and based on that sympathy
alone, they want you to convict Mr. Eddins. But look at the
evidence. Look at the facts. Remember and recall what the
witnesses said.
(Tr., Vo1.2, p.154, Ls.12-24.) Because the record clearly shows defense counsel
chose, as a matter of trial strategy, to respond to the prosecutor's statements
rather than object to them, Eddins' claim that the error he asserts for the first
time on appeal is meets the "clear and obvious" prong of Perry necessarily fails.
See Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 226, 245 P.3d at 976, 978 ("[R]equiring a
contemporaneous objection prevents the litigant from sandbagging the court, i.e.,
remaining silent about his objection and belatedly raising the error only if the
case does not conclude in his favor"; to that end, a defendant fails to meet the
second prong of Perry if there is even a "reasonable possibility" defense
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counsel's failure to object was tactical. (Citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Finally, Eddins has failed to show he was actually prejudiced by the
prosecutor's statements that, as a result of the acid attack, Daniel "lost his sense
of sight" or "lost his sight." For the reasons already stated, the statements were
proper and did not appeal to the jury to decide the case on anything other than
the evidence presented. Even assuming, however, that the statements could be
construed in a vacuum as having embellished the facts or improperly appealed
to the jurors' emotions, there is no reason to believe the result of the trial would
have been any different. Because Daniel Hight testified at trial, the jury was able
to personally observe the extent of his injury and was thus aware that Daniel was
still able to see out of his remaining eye. Moreover, the trial court specifically
instructed the jury that it was to decide the case solely on the evidence before it,
not on the arguments of counsel. (R., p.258 (Jury Instruction No.4).) Assuming,
as this Court must, that the jury followed the court's instruction, State v.
Grantham, 146 Idaho 490,498, 198 P.3d 128, 136 (Ct. App. 2008), there is no
reasonable possibility the jury was influenced by the prosecutor's remarks to
render a verdict based on sympathy or any other improper factor. Finally, and
most importantly, the jury actually acquitted Eddins of aggravated battery and
found instead that he was guilty only of the lesser included crime of aggravated
assault, a crime that does not require proof of any injury whatsoever. (Compare
R., p.266 (Jury Instruction No. 12) with I.C. § 18-901.) Had the jury actually been
swayed by the prosecutor's argument to decide the case based on emotion or
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sympathy for the victim, it surely would have made the finding, necessary for an
aggravated battery conviction, that Eddins actually used force or violence on
and/or injured the victim. (Compare R., p.264 (Jury Instruction No.1 0) with I.C.

§ 18-903.)
Eddins has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating fundamental error
with respect to his unpreserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct. This Court
should therefore decline to review the claim for the first time on appeal.

II.
Eddins Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering
Him To Pay Restitution For The Victim's Economic Losses That Were Actually
And Proximately Caused By Eddins' Criminal Conduct
A.

Introduction
The district court ordered Eddins to pay restitution in the amount of

$5,241.79 to cover the medical expenses Daniel Hight incurred as a result of the
chemical burn to his eye.

(R., pp.328-29, 339-40.)

Eddins challenges the

restitution award, arguing as he did below that, because the jury only found him
guilty of aggravated assault, rather than of aggravated battery, "the only culpable
action for which it could have convicted Mr. Eddins was making a threat," and
"[s]ince the threat - the words themselves - are incapable of causing physical
injury, the restitution award for losses related to Mr. Hight's physical injury is
erroneous." (Appellant's brief, pp.9-10.) Eddins' argument is without merit. A
review of the record and the applicable law supports the district court's
determination that the injury to Daniel's eye was caused by Eddins' criminal
conduct and, as such, Eddins is responsible for Daniel's medical expenses.
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B.

Standard Of Review
The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed

to the trial court's discretion. State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, _ , 296 P.3d 412,
417 (Ct. App. 2013); State v. Higley, 151 Idaho 76, 78, 253 P.3d 750, 752 (Ct.
App. 2010); State v. Card, 146 Idaho 111, 114, 190 P.3d 930, 933 (Ct. App.
2008).

The trial court's factual findings in relation to restitution will not be

disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882,
_ , 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013); State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d
398, 401 (2011).

C.

Substantial Evidence Supports The District Court's Finding That The
Victim's Injury Was Caused By Eddins' Criminal Conduct
Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) authorizes a court to "order a defendant found

guilty of any crime which results in an economic loss to the victim to make
restitution to the victim." For purposes of Idaho's restitution statute, a "victim"
includes any "person or entity, who suffers economic loss or injury as the result
of the defendant's criminal conduct." I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(e)(i) (emphasis added).

"Economic loss" includes, among other things, "the value of property taken,
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed ... and ... medical expenses resulting
from the criminal conduct." I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a) (emphasis added). "Therefore,

in order for restitution to be appropriate, there must be a causal connection
between the conduct for which the defendant is convicted and the injuries
suffered by the victim." State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401
(2011); accord State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, _ , 296 P.3d 412, 418 (Ct. App.
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2013); State v. Nienburg, 153· Idaho 491, _ , 283 P.3d 808, 811 (Ct. App.
2012); State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387,391,271 P.3d 1243, 1247 (Ct. App.
2012).
As recently reiterated by the Idaho Supreme Court, "causation consists of
actual cause and true proximate cause." Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at
401 (citing State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 374, 223 P.3d 750, 757 (2009)).
The Court articulated the distinction between actual and proximate cause as
follows:
"Actual cause is the factual question of whether a particular event
produced a particular consequence. [Lampien, 148 Idaho at 374,
223 P.3d at 757] (quoting [Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 875,
204 P.3d 508, 515 (2009)]).
The "but for" test is used in
circumstances where there is only one actual cause or where two
or more possible causes were not acting concurrently. Id. On the
other hand, true proximate cause deals with "whether it was
reasonably foreseeable that such harm would flow from the
negligent conduct." Id. (quoting Cramer, 146 Idaho at 875, 204
P.3d at 515). In analyzing proximate cause, this Court must
determine whether the injury and manner of occurrence are so
highly unusual "that a reasonable person, making an inventory of
the possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, would
not have reasonably expected the injury to occur." Id. (quoting
Cramer, 146 Idaho at 875,204 P.3d at 515).
Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 401. See also Cottrell, 152 Idaho at 392,
271 P.3d at 1248. The determinations of actual cause and proximate cause are
both factual questions. Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 401; Cottrell, 152
Idaho at 392, 271 P.3d at 1248.
Applying the two-part causation inquiry to the facts before it, the Corbus
Court upheld an award of restitution for injuries sustained by the victim when he
jumped out of Corbus' vehicle in the course of a police chase. 150 Idaho at 602-
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06, 401-05. Regarding actual cause, the Court found that, but for "Corbus' acts
of driving recklessly and eluding police officers and then failing to stop in
response to their overhead emergency lights," the victim "would not have needed
to" jump from the vehicle.

kL

at 603, 249 P.3d at 402. The Court also found

proximate cause existed because, based on the evidence that showed "Corbus
had created an extremely dangerous situation for his passenger by driving at
night, at excessive speeds, with no headlights on ... , it was reasonably
foreseeable that his passenger would decide to jump from the vehicle to avoid a
potentially serious car accident." Id. at 605, 249 P.3d at 404.
More recently, in Cottrell, supra, the Idaho Court of Appeals upheld an
award of restitution to the police officer victim for a knee injury he sustained
when he attempted to restrain Cottrell while Cottrell actively resisted and
obstructed the officer's attempt to arrest him. 152 Idaho at 390-94, 271 P.3d at
1246-50. The Court concluded that actual cause was "satisfied because the
evidence show[ed] it was Cottrell's acts of attempting to pull away from [the
officer] during arrest that precipitated the need for [the officer] to gain control of
Cottrell and, in so doing, twist his knee."

kL at 393,

271 P.3d at 1249 (footnote

omitted). The Court also found proximate cause, reasoning it was reasonably
foreseeable, based on Cottrell's repeated failures to obey the officer's requests
and submit to arrest, "that Cottrell's conduct would elicit a physical response
from [the officer], putting [the officer] in a position to injure his knee."

kL

As in Corbus and Cottrell, a review of the evidence in this case supports
the district court's award of restitution and, more specifically, its finding that the
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injury to Daniel's eye was caused by Eddins' criminal conduct. The uncontested
evidence at trial showed Daniel lost his eye as a result of a chemical burn
caused by an extremely caustic acid. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.111, 16 - p.122, L.14, p.135,
L.11 - p.137, L.25.) Both Daniel and Eddins testified that the acid belonged to
Eddins, and he was carrying it with him in a plastic bottle on the night in
question. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.22, L.23 - p.23, L.2, p.24, Ls.1-7, p.25, Ls.3-17, p.174,
Ls.7-14, p.176, Ls.18-24, p.177, Ls.2-5.)

Daniel testified that he originally

attempted to avoid a confrontation with Eddins by driving around the block, but
Eddins chased after him and they ended up in the same alley. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.20,
L.2 - p.21, L.17.) A confrontation then ensued, during which, Eddins admitted,
he was still holding the bottle of acid. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.21, L.24 - p.22, L.19, p.175,
Ls.18-24, p.177, Ls.4-5.)

Eddins also admitted to having threatened Daniel

during the confrontation, telling him to "back off, man, I have acid." (Tr., Vol. 1,
p.171, Ls.6-8, p.176, L.24 - p.1.) Daniel testified that Eddins struck him in the
eye with the bottle of acid. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.22, L.12 - p.23, L.2, p.24, Ls.1-2, p.43,
Ls.1-5.) Eddins denied this and testified Daniel pushed the bottle of acid out of
his hands, causing it to spill acid on both of them.
p.172,

L.8, p.172, L.24 -

p.173,

L.7, p.173,

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.170, L.19 Ls.17-21, p.177, Ls.6-9.)

Regardless, the undisputed evidence showed the acid Eddins was carrying
ended up in Daniel's eye, irreparably injuring it. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.25, L.18 - p.28,
L.4, p.111, L.16 - p.114, L.14, p.116, L.16 - p.121, L.24, p.135, L.11 - p.137,
L.25, p.177, Ls.6-9.) At a minimum this evidence shows that, were it not for
Eddins' acts of pursuing Daniel while carrying the bottle of acid and, ultimately,
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threatening Daniel with it, Daniel would never have been in a position to be
struck by the acid that injured his eye. Actual cause is thus satisfied in this case.
There is also sUbstantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's
implicit finding that Eddins' criminal conduct was the proximate cause of the
injury to Daniel's eye.

In opposing the state's restitution request, defense

counsel argued below that Eddins should not be held responsible for Daniel's
medical expenses because the jury, by finding Eddins guilty of aggravated
assault instead of aggravated battery, necessarily found that Eddins only
"threat[ened] to commit violence with the caustic acid," not that he actually
caused the injury. (Tr., Vo1.3, p.28, L.18 - p.29, L.16.) The district court rejected
this argument, concluding that the medical expenses Daniel incurred as a result
of the injury to his eye "clearly flow[ed] from the criminal conduct that Mr. Eddins
was found guilty of." (Tr., Vo1.3, pAD, L.16 - p.41, L.1.) The district court was
correct. The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict shows
Eddins armed himself with a bottle of acid, sought out a confrontation with Daniel
and then, during that confrontation, threatened Daniel with the acid.

Given

Eddins' extremely reckless conduct in carrying the bottle of acid in the first place,
it was reasonably foreseeable that Daniel or Eddins or both would be injured by
the acid Eddins himself threatened to use.
On appeal, Eddins merely reiterates the argument he made below,
contending he is not responsible for Daniel's injury, or the medical expenses
related thereto, because, based on the jury verdict finding him guilty of
aggravated assault, "the only culpable act for which [he] could possibly have
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been convicted was making a threat with the apparent ability to carry out that
threat." (Appellant's brief, p.13.) Eddins' argument is without merit. While the
state agrees with Eddins that "the [threatening] words themselves ... did not
cause the damage to Mr. Hight's eye" (Appellant's brief, p.13), Eddins' otherwise
conclusory claim that it is not "foreseeable that the words spoken will be capable
of impacting the physical world" (Id. (footnote omitted)) is simply not borne out by
the law, common sense, or the record.
The law dictates that crime victims are entitled to restitution for economic
losses, including medical expenses, that are actually and proximately caused by
the defendant's criminal conduct. I.C. § 19-5304; Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249
P.3d at 401. Common sense dictates that where a defendant makes a threat
with apparent ability to carry it out, it is at least reasonably foreseeable that the
threatened harm may come to fruition.

A review of the record shows that is

precisely what happened in this case. After Eddins threatened Daniel with the
acid he was actually carrying on his person, Daniel was injured by the acid.
Regardless of whether Eddins intentionally struck Daniel with the bottle of acid or
only threatened to do so, it was a reasonably foreseeable result that Daniel or
Eddins or both would be injured by the acid.
Substantial evidence supports the district court's finding that the injury to
Daniel's eye was caused by Eddins' criminal conduct.
establish an abuse of discretion in the restitution award.
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Eddins has failed to

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of
conviction and order of restitution.
DATED this 29 th day of May 2013.
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